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Summary 
Due to the aging of the population, the demand for care will continue to increase. The scope 
of informal care in this context is substantial. Previous literature has found that individuals in 
Norway facing extensive care responsibilities have a lower probability of being employed 
(Kotsadam, 2012). The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the contextual factors that 
affect the employment probabilities of individuals providing care intensively. To this end, the 
Norwegian municipalities are divided into groups according to level of publicly provided 
health and care services and level of support for filial responsibility norms. Publicly provided 
services are expected to have a positive effect on employment probabilities as these services 
can substitute informal care. Support for filial responsibility norms is expected to have a 
negative effect on employment probabilities as extensive support for these norms can lead 
to coercion in the care and work decisions of individuals. 
I find that for individuals in municipalities with high levels of support for filial responsibility 
norms and low levels of public eldercare, intensive caregiving is associated with a reduction 
in the employment probability of almost 9 %. A negative effect is also found for the group of 
municipalities with low levels of both support for filial responsibility norms and publicly 
provided eldercare. No significant effects are found for municipalities with low levels of 
support for filial responsibility norms and high levels of public eldercare and municipalities 
with high levels of both. The results indicate that contextual factors have an impact on how 
intensive caregiving affects employment probabilities. 
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1 Introduction 
As the Norwegian population ages, the pressure on the health and care sector will increase. 
Long-term care for elderly individuals is a shared responsibility between the welfare state 
and the family, and the scope of informal eldercare is substantial. The informal care 
provided, mainly by the family but also volunteers, is estimated to be within the same range 
as the publicly provided health and care services (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care 
Services, 2005-2006). With the coming challenges regarding eldercare it is important to gain 
knowledge about the effects of informal eldercare on employment probabilities. Policy goals 
of increasing informal care provision in order to face the demographic challenges may 
conflict with other goals, such as high labor force participation. This is especially true for 
women as they typically provide a high share of the informal care. 
This thesis focuses on the effect of informal eldercare on Norwegian individuals’ labor supply 
in different contexts. Previous literature in this area has largely focused on whether there 
exists a negative effect of informal eldercare on labor force participation. Hence, there is a 
gap in the literature concerning the contextual factors that affect these labor market 
outcomes. In order to investigate the effect of contextual factors, Norwegian municipalities 
are divided into groups according to specific characteristics. The level of publicly provided 
eldercare services in the municipalities is measured based on the hypothesis that there exist 
substitution effects between formal and informal care. The expectations regarding care 
provision to elderly parents that adult children face are also measured, as they may 
influence people’s care decisions. These expectations are here defined as filial responsibility 
norms. The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the effect of informal eldercare 
on employment probabilities differs between the studied municipality groups. 
The thesis proceeds with an overview of previous literature as background for the 
hypothesis. Further, I describe the Norwegian context focusing on public eldercare and filial 
responsibility norms and present some theoretical issues. The data and empirical strategy is 
then described, followed by the results and conclusions. 
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2 Literature review 
Several studies have examined the effects of informal eldercare on labor market outcomes. 
Lilly et al. (2007) provide an overview of research within this field. Reviewing 23 studies, they 
find that the probability of participating in the labor force does not seem to be reduced by 
care provision in general, yet individuals with great care responsibilities seem to have a 
much lower probability of labor force participation. Kotsadam (2011) finds that women’s 
employment is negatively associated with informal eldercare. Looking at Europe, he finds 
that the effects seem to be more negative in Southern European countries. Nordic countries 
show the smallest effects, and the Central European ones fall somewhere in between. 
Kotsadam (2011, p. 140) writes that “ This study argued that a possible explanation for the 
phenomenon of lower effects in countries with more formal care and less pronounced 
gendered-care norms has to do with the lesser degree of coercion in the caring decision.”  
Bolin et al. (2008b) also find that the negative effects of providing informal care of elderly 
parents on labor market outcomes vary between countries. The authors use data from the 
Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe and investigate how the effect of care 
provision on labor-market outcomes varies according to a north-south gradient. They state 
that cultural and institutional differences between countries in the north and south of 
Europe may be important when analyzing the relationship between informal eldercare and 
labor market outcomes. They sum up their results as follows: “(1) informal care reduced the 
probability of employment among women and men, (2) informal care reduced the number 
of hours worked when analyzing women and men together and (3) informal care showed no 
significant effect on the wage rate, neither among men nor among women” (Bolin et al., 
2008b, p. 723). They find that informal caregiving had stronger negative effects on the 
employment probability and number of hours worked in central Europe than in southern 
Europe. The authors suggest a hypothesis that may explain these findings: “The potential 
adverse effects of informal care on labor-market outcomes are less severe in countries 
where norms, traditions, preferences, and institutions favoring family loyalties and intra-
generational support are stronger, since, for instance, more acceptance might exist among 
employers and employees for the fact that you are caring for your elderly parents” (Bolin et 
al., 2008b, p. 720). 
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Using data from the Life Course, Generation and Gender survey (LOGG),  Kotsadam (2012) 
examines the effects of informal eldercare on the probability of being employed, the 
number of hours worked, and wages among Norwegian women. The respondents reporting 
that they provided informal care more than 20 times a month were classified as intensive 
caregivers. The data shows that 8 % of the population are classified as caregivers and 2 % as 
intensive caregivers. Kotsadam finds that being an intensive caregiver is associated with a 
6.7 % reduction in the probability of being employed. 
He further notes that except for intensive caregivers, there is no significant correlation 
between being a caregiver and the labor market outcomes investigated in his study. When 
separating between whether the caregiver and care receiver cohabit, in addition to 
differences in intensity, the author finds that “providing intensive care to someone living 
with the caregiver reduces the probability of being employed by 6.9 % points albeit only 
statistically significant at the 10 % level” (Kotsadam 2012, p. 278). When looking at different 
levels of care intensity, Kotsadam finds that the effect of informal care on the probability of 
being employed is apparent for those providing care at least ten times a month, with the 
effect increasing in magnitude as the intensity of caregiving increases.  
Although the literature described above indicates that the effect of being a caregiver in 
Norway is nonexistent, there is indeed evidence that being an intensive caregiver has 
significant effects on labor force participation. As stated by Kotsadam (2012, p. 281); “…the 
effects for this group are large … and their opportunity cost of caring should be considered 
when evaluating eldercare policies.” In the literature described above it is not clear how 
these effects depend on contextual factors. Kotsadam (2011) suggests that high levels of 
public care and low support for filial responsibility norms may reduce the adverse labor 
market outcomes. Bolin et al. (2008b), on the other hand, suggest that the adverse effects 
are lower when the support for filial responsibility norms is higher. One explanation for this 
might be that the employers in these contexts to a larger extent accept that adult children 
need time to care for their parents.  This thesis will try to elaborate the knowledge about 
how these contextual factors affect labor market outcomes of caring decisions. 
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3 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the potential adverse effects of informal eldercare on 
individuals’ probabilies of being employed depend on the context of the care decision. The 
supply of formal health and care services may be of importance for informal eldercare if the 
two types of care affect each other. Bolin et al. (2008a) find that formal and informal 
provision of help with daily activities are substitutes. Therefore, low levels of public health 
and care services may increase the need for informal care.  A broader description of the 
provision of public eldercare and the variation among municipalities is given in Section 4.1. 
Filial responsibility norms regulate obligations and generate motivation to care for frail 
elderly (Daatland and Herlofson, 2003). As filial responsibility norms may affect individuals’ 
care decision, it is important to include this factor. A high level of support for these norms 
may lead to coercion in the care decision. For a description of support for filial responsibility 
norms, see Section 4.2. 
Municipalities with low levels of support for filial responsibility norms and high levels of 
publicly provided eldercare services are expected to show no effect of informal care of 
elderly parents on individuals’ employment probabilities. The reason for this expectation is 
that individuals’ decision to provide care in this context is made without coercion. 
Municipalities with high levels of support for filial responsibility norms and low levels of 
public services are expected to show a negative effect on employment probabilities. In line 
with the reasoning for the previous statement, individuals in this context will face stronger 
constraints on their care and work decisions. When support for filial responsibility norms 
and the levels of public care are low, or the contrary, when support for filial responsibility 
norms and the levels of public care are high, it is unclear how informal care of elderly 
parents affects individuals’ labor supply. The hypothesis is shown graphically in the following 
figure. 
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Figure 1: Effect of informal care of elderly parents on labor supply in different municipality 
groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This hypothesis can be linked to the situation in Europe. As described in Section 2, Kotsadam 
(2011) finds the adverse labor market effects to be smallest in the Nordic countries. These 
are countries where the public health and care sector is relatively large, and the support for 
filial responsibility norms is relatively low. In contrast, the largest negative effects are found 
in the Southern European countries. In these countries, publicly provided health and care 
services are less prevalent and filial responsibility norms are more prominent.  
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4 The Norwegian context 
4.1 Public eldercare in the Norwegian municipalities 
The Norwegian municipalities organize the health and care services within their boundaries 
individually. The objective of this policy is to adapt the services to local priorities and needs. 
The law regulating how the municipalities should deal with the care task, Helse- og 
omsorgstjenesteloven, states the responsibilities of the municipalities and is, for example, 
intended to ensure quality, availability, and equality of services (Helse- og 
omsorgstjenesteloven, 2011). The freedom of action of the municipalities also depends on 
financial conditions. The services within the health and care sector are financed by block 
grants, earmarked grants, reimbursements from the National Insurance Scheme and user 
fees (Norwegian ministry of health and care services, 2010-2011).  
Huseby and Paulsen (2009, p. 141-143) describe the development in the Norwegian health 
and care sector from 1997 to 2007 – a period when eldercare gained a lot of political 
attention. The period started with the adaption of an action plan for eldercare for the years 
1998-2001. The Norwegian parliament adapted the plan with the objective to increase 
capacity and improve quality in order to meet the coming demographic challenges. Another 
target was to ensure uniform local provision of eldercare services although the local 
authorities were still to be responsible for shaping and developing the health and care sector 
(Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services, 1999). 
In Report No. 25 to the Storting the Government presented Care Plan 2015, which consisted 
of a national strategy for facing the coming challenges in the health and care sector in the 
next ten years (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2005-2006). In the plan, the 
Government emphasizes that the policy should be based on a modern equal opportunities 
perspective. The Government states that it wants to facilitate the combination of care 
provision and labor force participation, and a more equal division of care work between men 
and women. In order to both recruit personnel to the health and care sector and finance 
welfare schemes, it is essential to maintain a large workforce. 
7 
 
Daatland and Veenstra (2012, p. 84-86) use data from KOSTRA and IPLOS to analyze local 
variations within the Norwegian eldercare system. They measure the scope and the profile 
of eldercare in the municipalities. Scope is measured in terms of the gross operating 
expenses used in the health and care sector and the amount of services that these resources 
translate into. The profile is determined by how the resources are divided between users 
and service areas. Daatland and Veenstra (2012, p. 88) have satisfactory data from 383 of 
the municipalities in Norway. It is important to note that in their analysis, the municipalities 
are given equal weights regardless of size. Hence, the average for the municipalities cannot 
be interpreted as the average for the country or the population. When examining the 
amount of services provided, the authors distinguish between institutional care and services 
provided in the user’s home. Institutional care mainly consists of nursing homes. In-home 
care consists of both help with practical chores such as cleaning and grocery shopping, and 
health and care services as medication and personal hygiene. 
In their analysis, Daatland and Veenstra (2012, p. 89-92) find that the municipalities used, on 
average, 76 600 NOK on eldercare per inhabitant aged 67+ in 2009. This amount varies with 
the size of the municipality. The smallest municipalities have the greatest expenses, while 
the medium sized ones have the lowest. The largest cities are in between. Many elderly in 
the bigger cities live alone and the access to informal care may be lower. These 
characteristics may increase the eldercare expenses in these cities. Out of the average sum 
spent on each elderly person, almost three quarters is used on institutional care, while the 
rest is used on in-home care. The authors find that, on average, 19 % of those aged 67+ 
receive in-home services and almost 7 % stay, permanent or temporary, at an institution. For 
those aged 80+, 36 % receive in-home services and 15 % stay at an institution.  
There are large differences in the proportion of institutional care and in-home services in the 
different municipalities. To check whether the two types of services are substitutes Daatland 
and Veenstra (2012, p. 93-95) calculate the correlation between resources spent on 
institutional care and resources spent on in-home care for those aged 67+. They find a 
correlation of -0.16, indicating a modest level of substitution between the services. The 
correlation is stronger (-0.41) for the municipalities with more than 5 000 inhabitants. For 
those aged 80+ the authors calculate the correlation between the shares that receive 
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institutional care and in-home services. They find a weak negative correlation between the 
user rates of the two types of services. Again, the correlation is stronger for the 
municipalities with more than 5 000 inhabitants.  
Further, Daatland and Veenstra (2012, p. 99-104) examine possible variables explaining the 
differences in scope and profile between municipalities. They find that the municipalities’ 
unrestricted income is the strongest explanatory variable when looking at variances in 
resources spent on institutional care, but the restricted income is also important. In 
addition, distances within the municipalities and a variable capturing whether the 
municipality is a big city also explain some of the variation. Costs of institutional care is the 
strongest explanatory variable for resources spent on in-home services. When looking at the 
variation in user rates, the authors find similar results, i.e., the municipalities’ unrestricted 
income is the strongest explanatory variable for variation in user rates. Also as above, 
distances and whether the municipality is a big city also have some explanatory power. For 
the user rates for in-home services, the user rates of institutional services are the strongest 
explanatory variable.  
Huseby and Paulsen (2009) also examine differences between the municipalities within the 
health and care sector. Huseby and Paulsen (2009, p. 146-147) use KOSTRA and IPLOS data, 
but do not distinguish between institutional and in-home care as in Daatland and Veenstra 
(2012). The authors find that 62.9 % of the overall resources spent on health and care at the 
national level is spent on eldercare. However, there are great differences between the 
municipalities. Fifty of the municipalities use less than 50 % of the total health and care 
resources on eldercare, while 22 use more than 90 %. When analyzing factors that may 
account for the variation in expenses, Huseby and Paulsen (2009, p. 155-156) use many of 
the same indicators as Daatland and Veenstra (2012). They find that the need for eldercare, 
measured by age and mortality rates, the size of the municipality, the amount of 
unrestricted income and population density can explain about 43 % of the variation between 
municipalities in gross operating expenses for eldercare services. 
The authors use IPLOS data to analyze the coverage of health and care services for those 
aged 67+ (Huseby and Paulsen, 2009, p. 163-166). Regarding in-home services, they find that 
the average number of hours of care varies from less than 1 to 64 hours a week. The average 
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for all municipalities is 4 hours a week. The share of recipients of in-home services varies 
from 4 to 40 %. The average share of recipients in the municipalities is 19 %. For institutional 
care, the average share of residents varies from about 1 to 26 %. The average share is 7 %. In 
sum, the share of recipients of both in-home and institutional care varies between 7 and 47 
%. There is large variation among the municipalities. Only 8 % of the municipalities gave 
health and care services to less than 20 % of their population aged 67+; 90 % provided such 
services to 20-36 % of the population aged 67+. Huseby and Paulsen (2009, p.166-167) use 
many of the same indicators to explain the variation in coverage of services as when they 
analyzed the variations in expenses. They find that the share of people aged 80+, the share 
of people aged 67+ who live alone, the size of the municipality, population density, and 
whether it is a big city can explain about 46 % of the variation between municipalities in the 
total coverage of health and care services.  
The authors also examine municipal differences in the quality of health and care services 
(Huseby and Paulsen, 2009, p.173). Data from KOSTRA give the following indicators of 
quality: single rooms, user surveys, share of skilled employees and availability of doctors at 
the institutions.  In 90 % of the municipalities, more than 90 % of the rooms were single 
rooms. Between 46 and 91 % of the work years within the health and care sector was 
performed by personnel with relevant education. In 53 % of the municipalities, institutional 
residents had on average 11-20 minutes per week of doctor consultation. The four quality 
indicators are not related to each other, which implies that municipalities might have high 
scores on some indicators and low scores on others (Huseby and Paulsen, 2009, p.174). The 
other conditions discussed previously, such as resources and coverage, are, however, 
interrelated (Huseby and Paulsen, 2009, p.181). 
As described, there are great differences in the health and care sector across municipalities. 
These variations in formal care may be important for informal care provision if formal and 
informal care affect each other. Bolin et al. (2008a) state that informal and formal in-home 
care can be either substitutes or compliments – substitutes if informal care increases the 
productivity of formal care or if informal care reduces the probability of future help needs, 
and complements if the person providing informal care acts as the agent of the person 
receiving care (Greene, 1983; Lo Sasso and Johnson, 2002; Van Houtven and Norton, 2004, 
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referred to in Bolin et al., 2008a, p. 394). Their analysis suggests that when it comes to daily 
activities and in-home care for single-living elderly in Europe, informal and formal care are 
substitutes. It is however unlikely that informal and formal care is substitutes when more 
extensive care is needed, for example hospitalization. They find, as expected, that formal 
care provided in hospitals or doctors’ offices and informal care are complements (Bolin et 
al., 2008a). 
Jakobsson et al. (2012) investigate whether there is a relationship between formal and 
informal care in Norway. For each municipality formal care is measured by the share of the 
inhabitants who receive public care services. The authors find a negative relationship 
between the two types of care. Individuals in municipalities with extensive formal services 
provide less care than those in municipalities where the level of formal services is lower. The 
authors state that the provision of formal care probably does not exclude the family from 
care provision; rather, it leads the family to provide other types of support than health and 
care services. 
4.2 Support for filial responsibility norms 
Daatland and Herlofson (2003) discuss the importance of filial responsibility norms in care 
decisions. They state that filial responsibility norms “generate motivation or an intention to 
provide care and support” (Daatland and Herlofson, 2003, p. 545). Norms do not dictate 
family obligations, but they do regulate them. Even though norms are not necessarily 
translated directly into actions, they function as guidelines. Since they drive individuals’ care 
decisions, they may be important in order to understand behavior. Daatland and Herlofson 
(2003, p. 538) state that “Changes in attitudes and preferences are of great interest to policy 
makers, because they indicate the direction of service adjustments that will be required.” 
Daatland and Veenstra (2012, Chapter 9) discuss the balance of responsibility for the care of 
frail elderly between the family and the welfare state. They state that the norm of helping 
frail elderly typically relies on the partner, then children, and, after that, more distant 
relatives, friends and neighbors (Daatland and Veenstra, 2012, p. 157). Daatland and 
Veenstra (2012, p. 161-163) compare data from the international Generations and Gender 
Survey for Norway, France, Bulgaria and Georgia. In the survey, the respondents were asked 
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to what extent they think the family, the society or both should be responsible for providing 
care and financial support to elderly. They could choose between five options ranging from 
(1) mainly the society, through (3) equal responsibility, to (5) mainly the family. The authors 
find that a majority of Norwegian respondents place greater responsibility on the society 
than on the family. The equivalent percentage was substantially lower for the other 
countries. It is, however, difficult to know whether these differences stem from cultural 
ideals or differences in opportunities.  
Next, the respondents were asked to answer to what extent they agreed with two 
statements: (1) children should provide financial help to parents with financial difficulties 
and (2) children should adapt their job according to the needs of their parents. 44 % of the 
Norwegian respondents agreed with the first statement, and 13 % agreed with the second. 
These numbers generally get higher the further east and south in Europe the respondents 
come from. The relatively low numbers in Norway may be related to the ideal of 
independence between generations in Western Europe (Daatland and Veenstra, 2012, p. 
165-166). 
Norwegian elderly increasingly prefer to receive formal care services rather than care from 
their family (Daatland and Veenstra, 2012, p. 165). The Norwegian women generally expect 
less help from their children than do their male counterparts (Daatland and Veenstra, 2012, 
p. 167). Using data from LOGG, the authors find that respondents’ expectations of children’s 
filial responsibility decline with age of the respondent while expectations of parental 
responsibility increases with the age of the respondent. This implies that as people get older, 
they tend to increase their support of norms that are in the interest of other groups than 
their own; the elderly are less prone to demand help from their children (Daatland and 
Veenstra, 2012, p. 169-170). 
Daatland and Herlofson (2003) compare Norway, England, Germany, Spain and Israel using 
data from the OASIS study from 2000/2001. There are four statements, and the number of 
statements one agrees with measures the support for filial obligation norms. This filial 
responsibility scale is also included in LOGG, and contains the following statements: (1) adult 
children should live close to their older parents so that they can help them if needed, (2) 
adult children should be willing to sacrifice some of the things they want for their own 
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children in order to support their frail elderly parents, (3) older parents should be able to 
depend on their adult children to help them do the things they need to do, and (4) parents 
are entitled to some return for the sacrifices they have made for their children. The survey 
also measures attitudes regarding the relative responsibility of the welfare state and the 
family. The question is how much responsibility the family and the welfare state, 
respectively, should have in providing financial support, help with household chores, and 
personal care for older people in need. The respondents were given five options, here 
ranging from “completely or mainly a family responsibility”, through “both equally”, to 
“completely or mainly a welfare state responsibility.” Each respondent’s preferences for care 
were measured in two domains; “First for long-term care and support services, the choice 
being that either the family or formal providers should be responsible; and secondly for 
housing, the choice being to live with children or in congregate or institutional residences” 
(Daatland and Herlofson, 2003, p. 544). 
The authors find that filial obligation norms are widely upheld in all five countries. In 
Norway, the modal number of filial norm statements agreed with was one or two. 24 % of 
the Norwegian respondents did not, however, support filial obligations. A majority of the 
Norwegian respondents did not support statements (1), (2) or (4). 58 %, however, agreed 
with statement (3), which is about the same level of support as in Spain. Regarding financial 
support and help with household chores and personal care, a great majority of Norwegian 
respondents put the responsibility, mainly or totally, on the welfare state. Among those who 
agreed with all the filial obligation statements, nearly half still saw the welfare state as 
mainly responsible. This indicates that the expansion of the welfare state has not caused 
filial obligations to be eroded. Only about one percent saw the family as solely responsible. 
74 % of Norwegian respondents preferred formal services if they would need long-term 
care. It is worth noting that these answers may be influenced by subjective norms and actual 
care opportunities, and may therefore reflect more than just the individuals’ personal 
wishes. Most Norwegian respondents would also prefer to live in a congregate or 
institutional residence rather than with a child. The authors state that “It could be that 
future change in the sources of family care will be influenced more by what older parents 
prefer than by what their adult children are willing to offer” (Daatland and Herlofson, 2003, 
p.551). 
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One important feature of Daatland and Herlofson’s analysis is that they do not find any 
consistent gender differences in norms and preferences. In Norway, men were rather more 
supportive of filial obligation norms than women. This indicates that women’s dominance in 
provision of care to elderly does not reflect their particular norms and preferences, but is 
probably rather imposed upon them (Daatland and Herlofson, 2003). 
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5 Theoretical aspects of caregiving and 
labor supply 
Informal caregiving may affect labor force participation in three ways (Carmichael and 
Charles, 2003). First, individuals, dividing their time between care provision, employment 
and possibly other activities, face a time constraint. The demand for care provision may lead 
to a reduction in labor supply, which is called the substitution effect (Carmichael and 
Charles, 2003). Second, there may be substantial financial expenditures associated with 
providing informal care. These costs may be direct due to increased living expenses or 
indirect if care provision leads to loss of earnings (Atkin and Twigg, 1994, p. 41-42). Extra 
direct costs as a result of care demands may increase the labor supply of the care provider in 
order to meet the increased expenditures. This is called the income effect. Third, care 
provision may raise the need for a break from the care demands. Employment may have 
legitimacy that other activities outside the household or caring setting do not have (Atkin 
and Twigg, 1994, p. 43). Therefore, care responsibilities may provide motivation to 
undertake paid work in order to get such a relief. This is called the respite effect. 
Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) apply a theoretical framework where individuals derive utility 
from consumption, leisure and the well-being of their elderly parents. In this model the 
elderly parents are viewed as passive care recipients; it is the altruistic adult children who 
make the care decisions. These adult children allocate their time between taking care of 
elderly parents, leisure and paid employment, restricted by two constraints. The first 
constraint defines consumption to be less or equal to financial resources. The second is a 
time constraint. The model predicts that the adult child will adapt such that the marginal 
utilities of time devoted to paid labor, caregiving and leisure are equal. This implies that 
there is a negative relationship between time spent caring for elderly parents and labor 
supply.  
The health of the parent and caregiving of the adult child can be substitutes or complements 
in the parental welfare function. If they are substitutes, the effect of the adult children’s 
caregiving on the well-being of the parents will increase as the health of the parents 
deteriorates. This implies that the child will increase time devoted to caregiving and reduce 
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labor supply when the health of the parent deteriorates. The reason for this is that the 
marginal utility of care provision increases when the health of the parent declines.  
Care provided by the adult child can be substituted by other types of care, such as formal 
care and care provided by the adult child’s siblings. If such substitution effects exist, the 
model predicts that children will devote less time to caregiving as provision of other types of 
care increases. It might be that care provided by siblings of the same gender are closer 
substitutes than care provided by a sibling of the opposite gender. The model also predicts 
that other time demands, such as young children or a spouse in poor health, will reduce the 
time spent providing care by the adult child. 
Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000, p. 14) state that “The number of hours devoted to paid 
employment and informal care provision are mutually endogenous, since both are choice 
variables for the adult child.” For example, it might be that individuals with high levels of 
family devotion provide more informal care and have a lower labor supply. Or diligent adult 
children might devote more time to both employment and caregiving (Johnson and Lo Sasso, 
2000).  
Further, Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) test the predictions of the model.  They measure time 
assistance by the child’s provision of at least 100 hours of help in the past 12 months. This 
help could be either personal care assistance or help with chores and errands. The authors 
find that if the parent is in poor health, the adult female child is significantly more likely to 
provide care for the elderly parents than if the parent is in better health. If a woman has 
sisters, she is significantly less likely to provide help than a woman without sisters. Whether 
the woman has a brother does not significantly alter the probability of providing help. These 
results lend support to the theory that help by same-gender siblings might be substitutes. 
Contrary to the hypotheses, competing time demands generally did not reduce the 
probability that adult children helped their parents. Number of children aged 22 or younger 
and the presence of a spouse in need of care actually increased a woman’s probability of 
helping her parents. This might be because these time demands reduce the woman’s 
possibility of participating in the labor market, giving her more time to care for her parents.   
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The authors also investigate the determinants of hours of paid work. They write: “when 
jointly estimating the provision of time help and labor supply, we found that help to parents 
had large and significant effects for both men and women on hours of work” (Johnson and 
Lo Sasso, 2000, p. 24). Age, after an age of about 53 years, and own health had similar 
effects. Number of hours of paid work was, however, affected differently for women and 
men by educational level, marital status and nonwage income. In their conclusions, Johnson 
and Lo Sasso (2000, p. 25) state: “Women who devote an average of two or more hours per 
week helping their parents work about 43 percent fewer hours than women overall.” 
Norton and Van Houtven (2004) extend the classic Grossman model of health demand 
(1972, referred to in Norton and Van Houtven, 2004, p. 1162) to include informal care 
provision. As in the previous model, the adult child is altruistic. The adult child derives utility 
from the parents’ health status, which depends on care provided by all of the parent’s 
children, formal medical care and the stock of human capital. The adult child chooses 
consumption, leisure and level of informal care provision, restricted by a budget constraint, 
in order to maximize utility. The parents’ utility depends on consumption, leisure, informal 
care and own health status. The parents maximize their utility with respect to medical care 
subject to a budget constraint. The authors focus on how changes in informal care affect 
amount of medical care. They state that “a sufficient condition for a substitute relationship 
…, in addition to the usual assumptions, is that the marginal benefit to health of medical care 
with respect to informal care be negative or zero” (Norton and Van Houtven, 2004, p. 1162). 
The authors expect that informal care is a substitute for in-home care and nursing home 
care. If the adult child for example advocates the needs of the parent, then informal care 
and medical care may be complements for inpatient and outpatient care.  
The authors state three hypotheses that stem from this theoretical model. First, informal 
and formal care may be substitutes or compliments. Second, the relationship between 
informal and formal care will vary by type of formal health care. Third, care provided by the 
adult child is endogenous to the use of formal care services by the parent.  
In their empirical analyses, Norton and Van Houtven (2004, p. 1171) find that “informal care 
is endogenous in determining most but not all types of formal care considered”. Their results 
also suggest that informal care and in-home care and nursing home care are substitutes. The 
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only exception is for outpatient surgery. They find outpatient surgery and informal care to 
be complements.  The authors also find evidence indicating that the increase in outpatient 
surgery by informal care is dominated by the reduction in in-home and nursing home care, 
such that informal care is a net substitute to overall formal care. 
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6 Data and descriptive statics 
This thesis is based on the the Norwegian study on life course, generation and gender 
(LOGG). LOGG is a merger of two life course surveys: the first wave of the Norwegian 
Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) and the second wave of the Norwegian study on life 
course, ageing and generation (NorLAG). The data was collected in 2007-2008 from three 
sources: telephone interviews, a postal questionnaire and administrative register data 
containing information on personal details such as income, family, and education. The 
survey includes a nationally representative sample of the Norwegian population aged 18-79. 
The response rate for the telephone interview was 60.9 %, resulting in a net sample of 
14,892 persons. 10,794 of these individuals subsequently answered the postal 
questionnaire. The survey focuses on work and retirement, health and care, family and 
generations, and mastery and quality of life.  
Employment is identified via an affirmative answer to one of the following two questions; 
“Did you perform paid work for at least one hour last week?”  
“Do you have paid work from which you were temporarily absent or had time off from last 
week?”   
Provision of informal care was identified by an affirmative answer to the question; 
“In the last 12 months, have you regularly provided personal care to someone you (do not) 
live with, such as help with eating, getting up in the morning, dressing, or using the toilet? 
Do not include care for small children.” 
The respondents who stated that they provided such care were asked to estimate how many 
times a month they did so. The alternatives ranged from 0 to 40. Those stating that they 
provided care at least 30 times a month were classified as intensive caregivers. 
Unfortunately, due to an error, the respondents living alone were not asked the question of 
whether they provided personal care to individuals outside their household. This group 
consists of 1,814 individuals. There is also a similar question in the survey regarding practical 
help: “In the last 12 months, have you regularly proveded practical help to others who you 
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do not live with?” However, this question was not included in the care provision variable due 
to the possibility of it mainly consisting of other types of help than eldercare. Table 1 
provides definitions of the included variables. 
Table 1: Definition of variables 
Dependent variables 
Employed 
 
Main independent variables 
Care 
Intensive care 
 
Control variables 
Bad health 
Woman 
Age 
Age squared 
High education 
Middle education 
Married 
Widow 
Divorced 
Children 
Partner income 
 
Possible instruments 
Mother alive 
Father alive 
Mother memory 
Father memory 
Mother old 
Father old 
Mother limited 
Father limited 
Mother in need 
Father in need 
Siblings 
 
 
1 if paid employment last week or temporarily absent 
 
 
1 if providing care 
1 if providing care at least 30 times a month 
 
 
1 if health is self-assessed to be poor 
1 if woman 
Age of the respondent 
Age squared divided by 100 
1 if highest level of completed schooling is college/university 
1 if highest level of completed schooling is upper secondary school 
1 if married 
1 if widowed 
1 if divorced or separated 
1 if there are children under 11 years old living in the household 
Yearly income of partner (logged) 
 
 
1 if mother is alive 
1 if father is alive 
1 if respondent's mother is assessed to have bad memory 
1 if respondent's father is assessed to have bad memory 
1 if respondent's mother is 65 years old or older 
1 if respondent's father is 65 years old or older 
1 if respondent's mother is limited in her daily activities 
1 if respondent's father is limited in his daily activities 
1 if respondent's mother is in need of help to perform daily activities 
1 if respondent's father is in need of help to perform daily activities 
1 if the respondent has siblings  
 
 
The control variables included are age, age squared, marital status, having children under 
the age of 11 living in the household, educational level, gender, partner’s income, and 
whether the respondent reported to be in bad health. The sample is restricted to individuals 
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aged 18-65. Table 2 shows that 8.5 % of the population provide care, and 1.5 % provide care 
intensively.  
Table 2: Summary statistics of main variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Employed 12,305 .8464852 .3604977 0 1 
Care 10,752 .0853795 .2794585 0 1 
Intensive care 10,715 .0152123 .1224022 0 1 
Bad health 12,294 .0439239 .2049341 0 1 
Woman 12,305 .5077611 .4999601 0 1 
Age 12,305 42.12052 13.00568 18 65 
Age squared 12,305 19.43272 11.03272 3.24 42.25 
High education 12,305 .3683056 .4823645 0 1 
Middle education 12,305 .4461601 .497113 0 1 
Married 12,304 .4960176 .5000045 0 1 
Widow 12,304 .0138979 .1170721 0 1 
Divorced 12,304 .1133778 .3170669 0 1 
Children 12,305 .2850061 .4514357 0 1 
Partner income 11,444 8.139498 6.028447 0 16.18013 
 
The mean values for non-caregivers, caregivers, and intensive caregivers are compared in 
Table 3. We see that for those who report not providing any care, the employment rate is 
85.2 %. This does not change much for caregivers. Intensive caregivers, however, have an 
employment rate that is 7.3 percentage points lower than among non-caregivers. The 
significance of the difference in the mean values between the different groups was 
investigated applying a two tailed t-test. The difference in employment rates between those 
providing care intensively and those that do not provide care intensively is significant at the 
5 % level. We also see that the caregivers and intensive caregivers are more likely to be 
female. 
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Table 3: Comparison of mean values for non-caregivers, caregivers, and intensive caregivers 
 Non-caregiver Caregiver Intensive caregiver 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Employed 
badhealth 
Woman 
Age 
Age squared 
High education 
Middle education 
Married 
Widow 
Divorced 
Children 
Partner income 
 
0.852 
0.044 
0.509 
43.059 
20.159 
0.364 
0.448 
0.564 
0.014 
0.118 
0.331 
9.412 
 
0.355 
0.206 
0.500 
12.719 
10.913 
0.481 
0.497 
0.496 
0.117 
0.322 
0.471 
5.480 
 
0.844 
0.049 
0.621* 
45.592* 
22.222* 
0.359 
0.431 
0.588 
0.017 
0.149* 
0.271* 
9.404 
 
0.363 
0.216 
0.485 
11.989 
10.456 
0.480 
0.496 
0.492 
0.131 
0.357 
0.445 
5.499 
 
0.779* 
0.067 
0.626* 
46.546* 
22.967* 
0.331 
0.417 
0.626 
0.018 
0.166 
0.344 
10.000 
 
0.416 
0.252 
0.485 
11.445 
10.463 
0.472 
0.495 
0.485 
0.135 
0.373 
0.476 
5.150 
 
* Significant difference between caregiver/non-caregiver and intensive caregiver/non-intensive 
caregiver at the 5 % level 
If the sample is restricted to only women, we see from Table 4 that women not providing 
care have an employment rate of 83.2 %. This rate drops to 73.5 % for women providing 
intensive care. This difference in employment between those providing care intensively and 
those who do not is again significant at the 5 % level. As a comparison, but not shown in the 
table, the employment rate for men drops from 87 % for those not providing care intensively 
to 85 % for those who do provide care intensively. This difference is not significant. 
Table 4: Comparison of mean values for non-caregivers, caregivers and intensive caregivers 
when sample is restricted to only women 
 Non-caregiver Caregiver Intensive caregiver 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Employed  
badhealth  
Age  
Age squared  
High education  
Middle education  
Married  
Widow  
Divorced  
Children  
Partner income  
 
0.832 
0.046 
42.660 
19.774 
0.408 
0.409 
0.548 
0.021 
0.139 
0.334 
9.433 
 
0.374 
0.210 
12.551 
10.741 
0.491 
0.492 
0.498 
0.144 
0.346 
0.472 
5.654 
 
0.821 
0.051 
45.707* 
22.281* 
0.384 
0.381 
0.579 
0.026 
0.182* 
0.249* 
9.070 
 
0.384 
0.220 
11.800 
10.272 
0.487 
0.486 
0.494 
0.160 
0.387 
0.433 
5.808 
 
0.735* 
0.088* 
46.951* 
23.277* 
0.343 
0.343 
0.608 
0.029 
0.216* 
0.294 
9.775 
 
0.443 
0.285 
11.159 
10.276 
0.477 
0.477 
0.491 
0.170 
0.413 
0.458 
5.521 
 
* Significant difference between caregiver/non-caregiver and intensive caregiver/nob-intensive 
caregiver at 5 % level 
22 
 
Variables for the municipalities were also constructed. In order to assess support of filial 
responsibility norms across municipalities, the following statement was used; 
“Children should take responsibility for care when their parents need it.” 
The respondents were asked to respond on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “completely 
disagree” and 10 means “completely agree.”  The dataset contains several statements 
regarding filial responsibility norms that could have been used in order to identify these 
norms. However, inclusion of more than one of these variables would lead to concerns 
about how to properly weight the variables against each other. Thus, in order to avoid 
uncertainty, only one variable was included.  The reason for the choice is that the chosen 
variable is the one best suited to measure general support for filial responsibility norms, as 
the other questions to a larger extent concern specific topics. These variables focus more 
directly on situations such as whether children should live close to or with their parents, 
whether they should give financial support, and whether they should adapt their job 
according to the need of their parents. An overview of these variables is available in 
Appendix A.  
The LOGG dataset was complemented with data from IPLOS from 2008. IPLOS is a central 
register containing information on for example needs for help and assistance and reception 
of services. In order to measure the level of publicly provided health and care services, a 
variable measuring the share of recipients of such services out of the total population in the 
municipality was applied. This variable was used since formal care services and informal care 
might be substitutes (Bolin et al., 2008a), and specifically since the relationship between the 
share in a municipality receiving formal care and the share providing informal care is found 
to be negative (Jakobsson et al., 2012). Data on expenses for health and care services were 
also available, but since it is suggested that the relative spending by the municipalities on 
formal care does not affect the share of the population providing informal care (Jakobsson 
et al., 2012), this variable was not used.  
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7 Municipal groups 
I divide the municipalities into groups according to level of public care and support for filial 
responsibility norms. More exactly, they were divided as follows: (1) high level of both 
support for filial responsibility norms and public eldercare, (2) high level of support for filial 
responsibility norms and low level of public eldercare, (3) low level of support for filial 
responsibility norms and high level of public eldercare, and (4) low level of both support for 
filial responsibility norms and public eldercare. 
Regarding support for filial responsibility norms, the sample was restricted to only include 
municipalities where there were at least five responses to the filial responsibility norms 
statement. The dataset then includes 12,305 respondents from 220 municipalities. The 
median answer by all the respondents to the statement is 6. Variables indicating whether 
the median response for the respondents from each municipality was above or below the 
median response for all individuals were created. The municipalities with a median response 
above 6 were grouped as “high level of support for filial responsibility norms,” and those 
with a median response of 6 or below were grouped as “low level of support for filial 
responsibility norms.” The share of the total population in the Norwegian municipalities 
receiving health and care services ranges from 0.026 to 0.100. The median for all 
municipalities is 0.043. Variables indicating whether the median for each municipality was 
above or below the median for all the municipalities were created. Municipalities with a 
share of the population receiving services above the median were grouped as “high levels of 
public eldercare.” The municipalities where this share was equal to or below the median 
were grouped as “low levels of public eldercare.”  
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for each municipal group 
Group Number of 
municipalities 
Number of individuals Number of intensive 
caregivers 
Group 1 49 1,609 21 
Group 2 17 3,492 32 
Group 3 115 4,532 71 
Group 4 39 2,672 39 
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Table 5 displays the number of municipalities, the number of individuals in total, and the 
number of intensive caregivers in each municipal group. An overview of the municipalities in 
each of the four groups is available in Appendix B. 
Table 6 displays the mean values for the dependent and independent variables for the four 
municipal groups. Also here is a two tailed t-test applied to investigate the significance of the 
difference between each group and the rest of the sample. We see that the difference 
between the municipal groups for the share of intensive caregivers is insignificant. Group 2, 
which has a high level of support for filial responsibility norms and a low level of public 
eldercare, unexpectedly, displays a significantly lower share of caregivers compared with the 
rest of the sample. This group also has a larger probability of being employed, a lower share 
assessing their health to be bad and a higher share with a high educational level. Group 3, 
which has a low level of support for filial responsibility norms and high level of public 
eldercare, has a significantly lower probability of being employed, a larger share with bad 
self-assessed health and a lower share with high education. Concerning marital status, we 
see that in group 2, a significantly lower share are married and have children under the age 
of 11 in the household. The opposite is true for group 3, where the share of married people 
and the share with children are significantly higher than in the rest of the sample.  
Table 6: Comparison of mean values for each municipal group 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Employed 
Care 
Intensive care 
Bad health 
Woman 
Age 
Age squared 
High education 
Middle education 
Married 
Widow 
Divorced 
Children 
Partner income 
 
0.837 
0.088 
0.014 
0.049 
0.497 
42.778* 
19.934 
0.309* 
0.468 
0.529* 
0.012 
0.122 
0.287 
8.411 
 
0.370 
0.284 
0.119 
0.216 
0.500 
12.788 
10.836 
0.462 
0.499 
0.499 
0.111 
0.328 
0.453 
5.907 
 
0.860* 
0.074* 
0.012 
0.035* 
0.513 
40.414* 
18.071* 
0.496* 
0.360* 
0.418* 
0.011 
0.107 
0.248* 
7.081* 
 
0.347 
0.262 
0.107 
0.184 
0.500 
13.187 
11.146 
0.500 
0.480 
0.493 
0.106 
0.309 
0.432 
6.303 
 
0.835* 
0.089 
0.017 
0.050* 
0.507 
43.179* 
20.321* 
0.289* 
0.499* 
0.521* 
0.018* 
0.115 
0.299* 
8.605* 
 
0.371 
0.285 
0.131 
0.219 
0.500 
12.947 
11.060 
0.453 
0.500 
0.500 
0.133 
0.319 
0.458 
5.821 
 
0.855 
0.090 
0.016 
0.042 
0.509 
42.159 
19.404 
0.372 
0.457 
0.536* 
0.011 
0.114 
0.307* 
8.534* 
 
0.352 
0.287 
0.127 
0.200 
0.500 
12.772 
10.781 
0.483 
0.498 
0.499 
0.105 
0.318 
0.461 
5.927 
 
* Significant difference between caregivers/non-caregivers and intensive caregivers/non-intensive 
caregivers at 5 % level 
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8 Empirical strategy 
In this section the empirical strategy for analyzing the probability of being employed 
dependent on providing care is described. The specifications are as follows: 
1) Pr(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 1|𝑥) =  𝛼₁ +  𝛽₁𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 +  𝛾₁𝒙 +  𝜀₁ 
2) 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 𝛼₂ +  𝛽₂𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 +  𝛾₂𝒙 +  𝜀₂ 
where employed is a binary variable indicating whether the individual is employed, and care 
is a binary variables indicating whether the respondent provides informal care. As discussed 
in Section 6, this variable can be divided into informal care in general or, specifically, 
intensive informal care. x is a vector of variables controlling for individual factors. Lastly, 𝜀 is 
the unobservable random disturbance term. The first specification is a probit model. This 
model examines the marginal effect on the probability of being employed equaling one 
when care increases from zero to one. The second specification is the linear probability 
model. Here we apply an ordinary least squares (OLS) model where the dependent variable 
is binary.  
Lilly et al. (2007) examine factors affecting caregivers’ labor force participation and hours 
worked in 18 different studies. Two of these studies are from the UK, one is from Canada, 
and the rest are from the U.S. The studies suggest a number of characteristics of the 
caregivers that influence their labor market outcomes. These factors are gender, health 
status, age, intensity of care provision, level of available care substitutes, whether the care 
provider is an immediate family member of the care receiver, presence of young children in 
the care provider’s household, income and education. The authors emphasize the 
importance of controlling for individual factors to avoid overstating the effect of caregiving 
on labor force participation. In this analysis, variables controlling for individual factors are 
gender, whether the caregiver reports being in bad health, age, age squared, educational 
level, marital status, children under the age of 11, and income of the partner.  
A concern with this type of analysis is the possibility of endogeneity. Lilly et al. (2007) 
suggest that the caregivers self-select from a pool of individuals with low or no labor force 
participation, which indicates that these individuals already have low opportunity costs of 
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providing care. On the other hand, it might be that some individuals are particularly diligent 
and both provide more informal care and participate more in the labor force (Johnson and 
Lo Sasso, 2000). Consequently, there is reason to suspect that there may be a simultaneity 
problem when estimating the effect of care provision on labor supply; work and care 
decisions may be determined simultaneously. Not taking this endogeneity into account may 
cause the estimated coefficients to be biased. If the individuals are of the type described by 
Lilly et al. (2007), the coefficient will be overestimated. If the individuals belong to the group 
described by Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000), on the other hand, the coefficient will be 
underestimated.  
It is not possible to control for all such characteristics of the caregivers described in the 
previous section. Therefore, there is a possibility that the care variable is correlated with the 
error term. In such case, the OLS estimators would be biased. In order to address this 
problem the Instrumental Variables (IV) approach is applied. To use this approach, one 
needs to find at least one instrument that is both relevant and valid. For the instrument to 
be relevant it must be correlated with the care variable, conditional on the exogenous 
variables in the model. For it to be valid it must be uncorrelated with the error term, 
conditional on the exogenous variables in the model. The instrument should in other words 
affect employment only through the care variable. To find an unbiased estimate of the effect 
of care on the probability of being employed we follow a two-stage procedure: 
3) 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝑧 + 𝛾3𝒙 +  𝜀3 
4) 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 𝛼4 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛾4𝒙 +  𝜀4 
In the first stage, equation 3), we regress care on all the exogenous variables and the 
instrumental variable z using OLS. The error term in this equation is argued to be 
uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables. We now obtain the predicted value of care. 
In the second stage, equation 4), we replace the care variable in equation 2) with the 
predicted value of care, and obtain the instrumental variables estimators. The error term is 
argued to be uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, including the predicted care 
variable. This assumption hinges on the validity of the instruments. This cannot be proven, 
but I will argue for the validity of the instruments in the subsequent analysis. The relevance 
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of the instruments, however, is testable. Given that these conditions hold, the estimation 
will produce an unbiased coefficient of informal care on the probability of being employed.  
Previous studies have proposed variables that might satisfy these conditions. Bolin et al. 
(2008b) use health status and age of the respondent’s mother and father, whether the 
parents lived more than 100 km away, and the number of siblings as instruments in their 
analysis of employment effects of care provision. Kotsadam (2012) suggests the following 
instruments in his analysis: age of the oldest parent, whether the respondent lives with a 
parent aged 60+, whether a parent needs help in daily activities, whether a parent has bad 
health, and whether a parent has memory problems. 
The instruments proposed in this thesis are whether the respondent’s mother and father are 
alive, whether they have problems with their memory, whether they are aged 65+, whether 
they are limited in their daily activities, whether they are in need of help in order to perform 
daily activities and whether the respondent has siblings. Parents’ help needs are assumed to 
be positively correlated with their age, cognitive impairment, whether they are limited in 
daily activities and whether they need help to perform daily activities. One can expect that 
the care provided by the adult children depends positively on the help needed. Siblings may 
reduce the burden of the respondent; we can therefore assume that number of siblings is 
negatively correlated with the care variable. The proposed instruments should also be 
uncorrelated with the error term. It is reasonable to assume, for example, that health status 
of the parent affects the health status of the children, which again affects labor market 
outcomes. Therefore, it is crucial to control for such elements. By controlling for individual 
factors such as the health status of the respondents, their parents’ health status and help 
needs should not affect the individuals’ labor supply other than through the care 
responsibilities that they are facing. Whether the respondent has siblings is not expected to 
affect labor supply other than through support and division of responsibilities within the 
family.    
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9 Results 
The general results for the whole sample are displayed first, followed by the analysis for 
each municipal group. 
9.1 Results from general analysis 
Table 7 shows the marginal effects of being a caregiver and being an intensive caregiver on 
the probability of being employed. 
Table 7: Marginal effects of caregiving and intensive caregiving in a probit model. The 
dependent variable is Employed.  
 Full sample Full sample Women Men 
     
Care 0.002    
 (0.011)    
Intensive care  -0.073** -0.084** -0.050 
  (0.028) (0.040) (0.042) 
Bad health -0.402*** -0.400*** -0.403*** -0.385*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.038) 
Woman -0.056*** -0.055***   
 (0.005) (0.005)   
Age 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age squared -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.047*** -0.038*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
High education 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.113*** 0.065*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) 
Middle education 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.051*** 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
Married 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.015) 
Widow 0.024 0.025 0.019 0.007 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.032) (0.035) 
Divorced 0.004 0.003 -0.016 0.023 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.016) 
Children -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.072*** -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
Partner income 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 9,882 9,849 5,117 4,732 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We see that providing care does not display any significant effect on the probability of being 
employed. When looking at the full sample, intensive caregiving is associated with a 
reduction in the employment probability of 7.3 percentage points, which is significant at the 
5 % level. For the sample restricted to only women, the effect is -8.4 percentage points. 
There is no significant effect for men. 
As discussed under the empirical strategy, there may be an endogeneity problem. To 
address this, the IV approach is applied. 
Table 8: First stage results of regression treating the dependent care variable as endogenous 
Control variables  Proposed instruments 
    
Bad health 0.002 Mother alive 0.091*** 
 (0.007)  (0.033) 
Woman 0.006** Father alive -0.008 
 (0.003)  (0.023) 
Age 0.000 Mother memory -0.004 
 (0.001)  (0.008) 
Age squared 0.000 Father memory 0.023* 
 (0.001)  (0.013) 
High education -0.008** Mother old 0.000 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
Middle education -0.006 Father old -0.002 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
Married 0.002 Mother limited -0.000 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
Widow 0.008 Mother limited -0.006 
 (0.014)  (0.004) 
Divorced 0.006 Mother in need 0.012* 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
Children 0.006* Father in need 0.020** 
 (0.003)  (0.010) 
Partner income 0.000 Siblings 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.001) 
Constant -0.002   
 (0.015)   
    
Observations 8,932   
R-squared 0.012   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
First, we examine whether the proposed instruments pass the relevance criterion. We start 
by investigating which of the variables that significantly affect the care variable in the first 
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stage regression. From Table 8, we see that only whether the mother is alive and whether 
the father is in need of help have a significant effect on care at the 5 % or 1 % level. 
Therefore, the other proposed instruments are dropped in the subsequent analysis. 
Table 9: First stage results of regression treating the dependent care variable as 
endogenous; only relevant instruments included, and F test of excluded instruments.  
 Intensive care 
  
Bad health 0.007 
 (0.007) 
Woman 0.007*** 
 (0.002) 
Age 0.001 
 (0.001) 
Age squared -0.000 
 (0.001) 
High education -0.009** 
 (0.004) 
Middle education -0.007** 
 (0.004) 
Married 0.002 
 (0.004) 
Widow 0.006 
 (0.013) 
Divorced 0.005 
 (0.006) 
Children 0.003 
 (0.003) 
Partner income 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Mother alive 0.071*** 
 (0.022) 
Father in need 0.027*** 
 (0.009) 
Constant -0.007 
 (0.013) 
  
Observations 9,736 
R-squared 0.009 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
F test of excluded instruments: 
F(2,219) = 9.37 
Prob>F = 0.0001 
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Table 9 displays the results from the first stage regression only including the instruments 
found to be statistically significant in the previous regression. The coefficients of both 
instruments are positive, as expected. The relevance is tested further applying an F-test of 
excluded instruments. The null hypothesis of this test is that the coefficients of all 
instruments are jointly zero. The p-value of the test equals 0.0001, which allows us to reject 
this null hypothesis. The F-value, however, is 9.37, which is below the convention that it 
should be at least 10 for the instruments to be strong. 
Table 10 displays the second stage results. Intensive caregiving is still negative when treated 
as endogenous, but the coefficient is largely insignificant. We see that the standard error is 
very large, indicating that the estimate is not reliable. 
The model contains more instruments than assumed endogenous variables, which means 
that the model is overidentified. To test the validity of the overidentifying restrictions, we 
apply the Hansen J test. The null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with the error term; hence they only affect employment probability through 
care provision. The obtained Hansen J statistic is 0.895. The p-value value of the Hansen 
statistic is 0.3440, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
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Table 10: Second stage results of regression treating intensive caregiving as endogenous, 
and Hansen J overidentification test of all instruments. 
 Employed 
  
Intensive care -0.187 
 (0.277) 
Bad health -0.392*** 
 (0.021) 
Woman -0.049*** 
 (0.006) 
Age 0.043*** 
 (0.003) 
Age squared -0.056*** 
 (0.003) 
High education 0.097*** 
 (0.011) 
Middle education 0.042*** 
 (0.012) 
Married 0.007 
 (0.008) 
Widow -0.015 
 (0.035) 
Divorced -0.010 
 (0.015) 
Children -0.048*** 
 (0.007) 
Partner income 0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
Constant 0.072 
 (0.054) 
  
Observations 9,736 
R-squared 0.176 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Hansen J overidentification test of all instruments: 
Hansen J statistic = 0.895 
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.3440 
 
Lastly, I investigate the possible simultaneity problem closer. To this end, I perform a 
Hausman test to check for endogeneity. The null hypothesis is that there is no covariance 
between the care variable and the error term. The test compares the performance of the 
OLS estimator with the IV estimator. If the null hypothesis is true, both the OLS estimator 
and the IV estimator are consistent. In such case, one should use the OLS estimator as it is 
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more efficient. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the OLS estimator will not be consistent and 
IV should be applied. First, I estimate the first stage equation for care using OLS including the 
exogenous control variables and the instrumental variables. Second, I regress the probability 
of being employed on care and the control variables, including the residuals computed in the 
previous step as an additional explanatory variable. We test whether the coefficient of the 
new, additional variable vhat is significant.  
Table 11: Results from second step of Hausman test.  
 Employed 
  
Care -0.023 
 (0.117) 
Bad health -0.395*** 
 (0.021) 
Woman -0.050*** 
 (0.007) 
Age 0.043*** 
 (0.003) 
Age squared -0.056*** 
 (0.003) 
High education 0.099*** 
 (0.011) 
Middle education 0.044*** 
 (0.011) 
Married 0.008 
 (0.008) 
Widow -0.017 
 (0.036) 
Divorced -0.010 
 (0.015) 
Children -0.049*** 
 (0.007) 
Partner income 0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
vhat 0.027 
 (0.119) 
Constant 0.069 
 (0.056) 
  
Observations 9,769 
R-squared 0.179 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As shown in Table 11, this coefficient is insignificant. Thus, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. This implies that we cannot conclude that care is endogenous. Treating care as 
exogenous is in line with several studies such as Kotsadam (2012) and Bolin et al. (2008b). 
These studies specifically investigate the possibility of endogeneity, and are unable to reject 
the hypothesis that informal care is exogenous. Based on the results from the Hausman test 
and these findings in the literature, care will be treated as exogenous in the following 
analysis. 
One concern of this conclusion, however, is that the instruments included in the Hausman 
test are not particularly strong. This reduces the power of the test. Unfortunately, I was not 
able to find better suited instruments in the dataset. In addition, Lilly et al. (2007, p. 670), 
conclude that, based on of five studies, “The extent of the potential for endogeneity bias 
remains uncertain.” However, the authors reach this conclusion based on the conflicting 
results regarding how preexisting employment status affects the probability of becoming a 
caregiver. These studies may, therefore, not be optimally suited to investigate endogeneity 
rising from other factors than preexisting employment status, such as diligence (as proposed 
by Johnson and Lo Sasso, 2000).  
9.2 Results from municipal analysis 
In this section, the effect of intensive caregiving on employment for each municipal group 
will be analyzed to investigate the importance of contextual factors. I follow the findings 
from the previous section, and treat care as exogenous in the subsequent analysis.  
From Table 12 we see that for group 2, where there are high levels of support for filial 
responsibility norms and low levels of public eldercare, intensive caregiving has a negative 
marginal effect on the probability of being employed. This effect is significant at the 5 % 
level. This implies that for individuals in municipal group 2, intensive caregiving is associated 
with a reduction in the probability of being employed by 8.7 %. This is in line with the 
hypothesis suggesting that these individuals face stronger constraints on their work and care 
decisions. Based on the initial hypothesis, it was unclear how intensive informal care would 
affect the probability of being employed in group 4. In this group the municipalities have low 
levels of both support for filial responsibility norms and public eldercare. Table 12 shows 
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that group 4 displays a negative coefficient of 9.2 %, only significant at the 10 % level, 
however. 
Table 12: Marginal effects on employment for each municipal group 1 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
     
Intensive care -0.089 -0.087** -0.051 -0.092* 
 (0.088) (0.036) (0.044) (0.060) 
Bad health -0.344*** -0.334*** -0.420*** -0.456*** 
 (0.060) (0.038) (0.038) (0.061) 
Woman -0.035** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.064*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) 
Age squared -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) 
High education 0.130*** 0.057*** 0.097*** 0.069*** 
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) 
Middle education 0.065*** 0.006 0.051*** -0.007 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
Married 0.004 0.026*** 0.025 -0.032 
 (0.032) (0.006) (0.021) (0.022) 
Widow -0.009 0.018 0.047 -0.000 
 (0.066) (0.023) (0.026) (0.058) 
Divorced -0.009 0.040*** -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.037) (0.010) (0.026) (0.036) 
Children 0.000 -0.059*** -0.041** -0.045* 
 (0.027) (0.014) (0.015) (0.029) 
Partner income 0.006 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Observations 1,349 2,475 3,811 2,214 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Intensive caregiving does not have any significant marginal effect on the probability of being 
employed in group 3. It was expected that group 3, where there are low levels of support for 
filial responsibility norms and high levels of public eldercare, would not display any 
significant effect. The reason for this expectation is that individuals in this group make their 
care decisions without coercion. As with group 4, it was, based on the hypothesis, unclear 
how intensive informal care would affect the probability of being employed in group 1. For 
                                                 
1 The same analysis was performed restricting the sample to only women. Then, there was a negative effect in 
group 4 (only significant at the 10 % level, however). There were no significant effects for the other group. One 
concern of this analysis is that the sample size is very small. 
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group 1, where there are high levels of both support for filial responsibility norms and public 
eldercare, there are no significant effects of intensive caregiving on the probability of being 
employed. 
One should keep in mind when reading these results that the sample of intensive caregivers 
in each municipal group is quite small and that there were no significant difference in the 
share of intensive care providers between the groups. The sample size was reduced from the 
original dataset when the municipalities with less than five respondents answering the filial 
responsibility norms statement were dropped from the analysis. This reduction of the 
sample size reduced the effect of intensive caregiving on employment. As shown in Table 7, 
the marginal effect on employment of intensive caregiving was -7.3 percentage points and 
significant at the 5 % level. By applying the same model in the original dataset before the 
reduction, the estimated coefficient is -9.1 and significant at the 1 % level. Further dividing 
the sample into the municipal groups would have made it increasingly difficult to find 
significant effects as the total number of intensive caregivers in each group was reduced. 
There might be effects of intensive caregiving on the probability of being employed that are 
not detected in this analysis due to low statistical power. Lower statistical power will 
increase the standard errors. On the other hand, the size of the estimated coefficients does 
not change much when the sample is divided into the municipal groups.  
It might be that the variables measuring support for filial responsibility norms and level of 
public services, which are used to divide the municipalities into groups, are not measured 
appropriately. Norms are generally difficult to measure. It might, for example, be that the 
wording of the statement measuring filial responsibility norms influences the respondents’ 
answer in a certain way. As described by Daatland and Herlofson (2003), a weakness of 
measures of filial norms is that there is often a bias towards affirmative answers. It might 
also be that respondents holding an opinion that they believe is regarded as “incorrect” by 
others may change their response in order to comply with the majority.  
It may also be difficult to measure the level of publicly provided services in an appropriate 
way. One reason is that it is difficult to compare different services between municipalities. 
Different conditions in the municipalities affect how they arrange their services, and 
Daatland and Veenstra (2012, p. 92) argue that there is no unambiguous relationship 
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between indicators of resources used in the health and care sector, and how good the 
service provision is. As described in Section 4.1 there are large municipal differences in the 
division between in-home services and institutional care. In this analysis, only in-home 
services were included as these services are more likely to be substitutes for informal care. 
The exclusion of institutional services may therefore lead to inaccurate measures of publicly 
provided services. In addition, the quality of the publicly provided services may be important 
for individuals’ care decisions. This aspect is also difficult to measure in an appropriate way, 
and is not accounted for by the share of recipients. Quality may therefore also bias the 
measure of publicly provided services. 
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10 Conclusions 
The goal of this thesis was to investigate how contextual factors influence individuals’ work 
and care decisions. The Norwegian municipalities were divided into four groups according to 
level of publicly provided health and care services and level of support for filial responsibility 
norms. The hypothesis was that individuals in municipalities with high levels of support for 
filial responsibility norms and low levels of public services would be more negatively affected 
by their intensive caregiving responsibilities than individuals living in other types of 
municipalities. The results of the analysis suggest that the employment probabilities of these 
individuals are indeed negatively affected. This may be due to coercion in the care decision, 
which forces individuals to provide more care than they are able to, without reducing their 
connection to the labor market. The municipalities with low levels of support for filial 
responsibility norms and high levels of publicly provided services were expected to not show 
any effect of intensive caregiving on employment probability. The findings for this group are 
also in line with the hypothesis. For the last two groups, there were no clear predictions. A 
negative effect on the employment probability also seems to apply for intensive caregivers 
in municipalities with low levels of both support for filial responsibility norms and publicly 
provided eldercare. For the municipalities with high levels of both support for filial 
responsibility norms and publicly provided eldercare, on the other hand, no significant labor 
market effects were found.  
The results indicate that the context of the care decision has an impact on the adverse labor 
market effects arising from intensive caregiving. Therefore, such factors should be taken into 
consideration when adapting both formal and informal caregiving to the coming 
demographic challenges.  
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Appendix A 
Below is an overview of variables measuring support for filial responsibility norms that are 
available in the LOGG dataset. 
Filial responsibility scale 
The respondents were asked to answer whether they strongly agree/agree/neither agree 
nor disagree/disagree/strongly disagree with the following statements: 
(1) Adult children should live close to their parents so that they can help them if needed. 
(2) Adult children should be willing to sacrifice some of the things they want for their 
own children in order to support their frail elderly parents. 
(3) Older parents should be able to depend on their adult children to help them do the 
things they need to do. 
(4) Parents are entitled to some return for the sacrifices they have made for their 
children. 
Adult children’s care responsibility for parents  
The respondents were asked to answer the following statements on a scale from 0 to 10; 
where 0 means “completely disagree” and 10 means “completely agree.”   
(1) Children should take responsibility for care when their parents need it. 
(2) Children should adapt their job according to the needs of their parents. 
(3) When parents are in need of help, daughters should take more responsibility for care 
than sons. 
(4) Children should give financial help to parents with economic difficulties. 
(5) Children should have their parents living in their residence when their parents are 
unable to take care of themselves. 
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Appendix B 
Table 13: A list of the municipalities included in the analysis sorted by municipal groups 
Group 1 - High level of both support for filial responsibility norms and public eldercare 
Sarpsborg 
Fredrikstad 
Kongsvinger 
Stange 
Eidskog 
Åmot 
Tynset 
Folldal 
Nord-Fron 
Sel 
Sør-Fron 
Ringebu 
Vestre Toten 
Nordre Land 
Øystre Slidre 
Drammen 
Ringerike 
 
Ål 
Hol 
Øvre Eiker 
Re 
Stokke 
Porsgrunn 
Skien 
Nome 
Bø (Telemark) 
Sauherad 
Tinn 
Evje og Hor 
Kristiansand 
Etne 
Kvinnherad 
Odda 
Voss 
 
Vaksdal 
Osterøy 
Radøy 
Høyanger 
Årdal 
Selje 
Gloppen 
Hareid 
Volda 
Ørskog 
Averøy 
Gjemnes 
Narvik 
Torsken 
Storfjord 
 
 
Group 2 - High level of support for filial respondibility norms and low level of public eldercare 
Ås 
Bærum 
Oslo 
Lunner 
Nedre Eiker 
Sande (Vestfold) 
 
Andebu 
Sandnes 
Stavanger 
Gjesdal 
Rennesøy 
Sund 
 
Flora 
Sogndal 
Molde 
Trondheim 
Melhus 
 
 
Group 3 - Low level of support for filial responsibility norms and high level of public eldercare 
Halden 
Hvaler 
Marker 
Rakkestad 
Eidsvoll 
Hamar 
Ringsaker 
Løten 
Nord-Odal 
Sør-Odal 
Grue 
Åsnes 
Våler (Hedmark) 
Larvik 
Svelvik 
Hof 
Tjøme 
Lardal 
Notodden 
Siljan 
Kragerø 
Drangedal 
Seljord 
Kviteseid 
Vinje 
Risør 
Fjaler 
Gaular 
Bremanger 
Vågsøy 
Eid 
Stryn 
Ålesund 
Kristiansund 
Vanylven 
Herøy (Møre og Romsdal) 
Ørsta 
Norddal 
Stranda 
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Elverum 
Trysil 
Stor-Elvdal 
Lillehammer 
Gjøvik 
Lom 
Vågå 
Øyer 
Gausdal 
Østre Toten 
Jevnaker 
Gran 
Søndre Land 
Sør-Aurdal 
Nord-Aurdal 
Kongsberg 
Hole 
Nes (Buskerud) 
Gol 
Sigdal 
Modum 
Hurum 
Nore og Uvdal 
Holmestrand 
Tønsberg 
Sandefjord 
 
Arendal 
Bygland 
Åseral 
Kvinesdal 
Eigersund 
Haugesund 
Sokndal 
Lund 
Hå 
Hjelmeland 
Suldal 
Sauda 
Tysvær 
Vindafjord 
Bømlo 
Fitjar 
Ullensvang 
Kvam 
Fusa 
Austevoll 
Meland 
Lindås 
Gulen 
Aurland 
Luster 
Askvoll 
 
Skodje 
Haram 
Vestnes 
Rauma 
Nesset 
Fræna 
Eide 
Tingvoll 
Sunndal 
Surnadal 
Aure 
Rissa 
Steinkjer 
Namsos 
Verran 
Namsskogan 
Grong 
Vikna 
Nærøy 
Harstad 
Bardu 
Målselv 
Dyrøy 
Lenvik 
 
 
Group 4 - Low level of both support for filial responsibility norms and public eldercare 
Frogn 
Asker 
Lørenskog 
Skedsmo 
Nittedal 
Ullensaker 
Hemsedal 
Lier 
Røyken 
Horten 
Nøtterøy 
Bamble 
Grimstad 
 
Froland 
Klepp 
Time 
Sola 
Randaberg 
Strand 
Karmøy 
Bergen 
Sveio 
Stord 
Os (Hordaland) 
Fjell 
Askøy 
 
Førde 
Ulstein 
Sykkylven 
Sula 
Giske 
Orkdal 
Skaun 
Klæbu 
Malvik 
Stjørdal 
Levanger 
Bodø 
Tromsø 
 
 
